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1. Introduction
1 By  “complementary  currency  system”  (CCS)  we  mean  a  specific  unit  (or  system)  of
account that complements the official currency and has been developed by a group of
agents (individuals, economic and social structures, local authorities or banks) that has
formed a local network with a view to accounting for and regulating exchanges of goods
and services. From a functionalist theoretical viewpoint CCSs are money. They fulfill the
main functions of the latter by acting as a medium of exchange and unit of account within
a defined geographic region or community, and in many cases also as a store of value. 
2 CCSs are by no means new to history; since the 1980s they have been attracting more and
more attention and growing apace in both developed and developing economies. Some
3,500 to 4,500 systems have so far been recorded in more than 50 countries (Blanc, 2006;
Seyfang,  and  Longhurst,  2013a).  Among  the  better-known  are  LETS  (Local  Exchange
Trading System) in Canada and the United Kingdom (Lee, 1996; Williams, 1996a), Time
Banks in Italy and the UK (Coluccia, 2001; Seyfang, 2003, 2006), local currencies of barter
clubs in Argentina (Gomez, 2009; Ould Ahmed, 2010), the Ithaca Hour in the United States
(Collom, 2005; Jacob et al., 2004; Maurer, 2005; North, 2014), regiogeld such as Chiemgauer
in Germany (Gelleri, 2009; Thiel, 2012), community development banks in Brazil (Borges,
2010; Melo et al., 2009; Neiva et al., 2013), the SOL (Fare, 2010, 2011), the Eusko and the
SoNantes in France, the Brixton Pound, the Stroud Pound and the Bristol Pound in the UK
(Ryan-Collins, 2011; Scott Cato and Suárez, 2012), the WIR system in Switzerland (Stodder
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2009), and the Accorderies in Quebec and in France (Comeau and Boulianne, 2012; Fare,
2011). 
3 These monetary schemes have and objectives responding to challenges that echo the
current context of crisis in the regime of financial globalization. They aim at reconciling
sustainable local development with better social integration; at developing new standards
of production and consumption (ecological, environmental, and solidarity-based); and at
promoting new economic and monetary governance based on democratic sovereignty
with civil society playing an active part. 
4 Despite the relevance of CCSs and their development, we note that it is a difficult topic to
grasp within “conventional economic thought” (Lietaer et al.,  2010)1 for a number of
reasons. This article is an attempt to show that conventional economics is based on a
methodological approach and on theoretical and normative conceptions of money – its
essence, size, status and regulatory norms – that are an obstacle to understanding the
emergence, logics and impact of these new monetary schemes. Firstly, according to the
relative novelty of CCSs and their heterogeneity, conventional economics is faced with a
methodological  difficulty  to  assess  their  impact.  Next  we  show that,  because  of  the
limited purchasing power of CCSs in time and space, this theoretical approach is unable
to justify their use in the market economy. Lastly, we will show that the atypical rules
governing the issue and regulation of these monetary schemes are an added obstacle to
recognition and legitimation. The conclusion argues that other theoretical perspectives
are more adequately equipped to study CCSs. 
 
2. CCSs: the issue of their impact 
5 Because of their very diversity and the fact that they have emerged relatively recently,
complementary  currency  systems  seem  to  pose  a  methodological  problem  to
conventional economic thought. They have not yet been thoroughly studied. While there
is a substantial amount of literature on CCSs, most existing works consist of individual-
level surveys of one particular CCS (a case study), describing the motivations of users and
promoters, the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the scheme, and assessing
its impact (Fare and Ould Ahmed, 2016). So far there is, however, no study summarising
the overall impacts of these CCSs with the noteworthy exception of the excellent survey
by Michel and Hudon (2015) that seeks to find out whether CCSs contribute to the three
pillars of sustainable development.
6 These  methodological  problems  stem  from  the  fact  that  there  is  to  date  no
comprehensive  database  covering  all  CCSs  on  a  worldwide  scale  and  providing
quantitative  data  on  their  users2.  Without  proper  econometric  studies  –  which  are
impracticable  -  it  is  difficult  to  account  properly  for  individual  behaviour,  for
quantitative  aspects  and  for  the  logics  involved.  Fieldwork  should  be  undertaken to
obtain  data  through  impact  analyses.  For  example,  Krohn  and  Snyder  (2008),  in  an
econometric study of local currencies in the USA, have shown that the local multiplying
effect  was  too  weak  to  be  detected  in  growth  per  capita  income  during  the  1990s.
However, these results should be relativized: the authors failed to compare the volume of
local currency in circulation (and the value added created in CCS) with that of the overall
volume of money in circulation. In another context, using a random network-simulation
model,  Japanese  economists  such  as  Kichiji  and  Nishibe  (2012)  have  shown that  the
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distribution of money held by agents influences the rate of transactions carried out as a
function of the money in stock. 
7 In  general,  however,  there  are  few studies  of  this  sort,  because  of  the  difficulty  of
quantifying and of distinguishing between exchanges conducted in CCSs and that using
other  currencies.  These  difficulties  are  also  due  to  the  extreme  diversity  of  CCSs
throughout  the  world.  Besides  this  lack  of  directly  usable  data,  the  CCSs  are  not
homogeneous: their material form varies – paper money, scriptural money, smart card3 –
as  does  the  conception  of  the  role  of  money  and  its  usages  in  the  new  market
communities.  CCSs  also  have  a  broad diversity  of  objectives:  single  or  multiple  (e.g.
economic, social and environmental). The empowerment they aim to introduce can have
different ideological  bases and entail  different modes of  governance (Table 1).  It  can
support a local economy established in the territory, integrate new ambitious production
or consumption practices based on social and ecological standards. It can involve civil
society in economic and monetary decision-making.  While some systems, such as the
Ithaca Hour money in the US (Maurer, 2005; North, 2014) are oriented towards support for
the  local  production  apparatus,  employment,  production  and  local  dynamics,  others
target the growth of sustainable consumption, e.g. the green point customer fidelity cards
of  the  NU-Spaarpass in  Rotterdam  (Sambeek  and  Kampers,  2004)  and  the  eco  iris in
Brussels. Japanese complementary currencies that privilege social objectives by seeking
basically  to  recreate  traditional  community  bonds  –  local,  and  in  some  cases  inter-
generational  (l’uchi) –  offered  from  exploitative  production  relations  (Hirota,  2006).
Complementary currency systems also differ in the degree of the connexion they set up
with local authorities, banks, economic and social structures, and the third sector (Blanc
and Fare,  2013).  For example,  the SoNantes launched in April  2015 at Nantes (France)
developed close links with the municipality, local businesses, and the Nantes Municipal
Credit (through its subsidiary Sonao), which handles the account management of this new
complementary smart card. On the contrary, the SEL (France) base their autonomy on
respect by the local  authorities and set up a few partnerships.  Furthermore a varied
range of  geographical  contexts  gives  rise  to  CCS with socio-economic profiles  of  the
actors involved. In Southern countries CCSs often emerge in reaction to an economic
crisis and are related to population strata suffering from high degrees of social insecurity.
These strata are usually impoverished and their support for complementary currency
systems springs  mainly  from their  economic  needs.  In  contrast,  CCS  that  emerge  in
Northern countries  are linked to a  more varied range of  social  strata (ranging from
people in precarious positions to countercultural groups), and the motivations concerned
are also more diverse (environmental or ideological, and not solely economic). A common
geographical feature is that they primarily showed up in urban and peri-urban areas. 
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8 In evaluating impacts, a methodological difficulty arises when we have to deal with the
specifics of each CCS in terms of objectives, forms and social group profiles - particularly
when using the widely randomized control trials proposed by Esther Duflo (Banerjee and
Duflo, 201) and her J-PAL team (Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab). Evaluation by
means of randomized control is aimed at “establishing a credible comparison group, a
group of individuals who, as there is no programme, would have given rise to results
similar to those displayed in the programme” (Duflo, 2005, p. 188). Using this “control
group” one can compare the effects on individuals of a programme, project or policy that
is being envisaged. Surveys of this type usually aim at measuring the effects of a given
programme in  terms of  monetary  poverty  at  the  individual  level.  This  experimental
approach can be useful in studying the impact of such-and-such a particular measure, but
it is limited in its effects. It predetermines the objectives to be reached, then compares
the results with these objectives, but without discerning other effects that might have
affected  the  people  involved  in  the  process.  This  particular  factor  underlies  (and
undermines)  efforts  to  establish  direct  causal  links  between  the  effects  and  the
programme,  and to  neutralise  the  relevant  structural  and institutional  conditions  in
which  the  programme  is  being  carried  out.  Causality  should  not  be  treated
probabilistically when the context makes generalisation problematic. This method takes
into account only the average impact without capturing the diversity of effects, and does
so  only  in  the  short  term (Labrousse,  2010),  hiding ripple  effects  and the  effects  of
learning,  composition  and  imitation  (Bédécarrats  et al. ,  2013).  Furthermore,  no
explanation is given of the reasons, processes and causal mechanisms involved, the whys
and the wherefores.  It  establishes only causal  links between the programme and the
effects. Yet the factors involved are multiple, as are the interactions. Effects resulting
from interactions between multiple  factors  are always situated socially  and bear  the
stamp of the context in which they take place. Because of this, causal links should be
examined in all  their  complexity,  with dynamic interactions grasped in context,  and
institutional  and  socio-economic  dimensions  taken  into  account.  The  effects  of  a
programme cannot be defined uniquely in terms of predetermined objectives, nor can
they be summarised by accumulating quantitative data unaccompanied by explanations. 
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9 Current literature on CCS emanating mainly from economic geography, socioeconomics
and institutional  economics,  uses alternative methodology.  To evaluate the impact of
CCSs, the authors adopt quantitative and qualitative criteria, the relevance of which is
tied to forms and objectives that are proper to each monetary system. The indicators of
assessment and the criteria adopted are heterogeneous, and as there is no standardized
assessment tool common to all authors it is by no means easy to compare the various
monetary experiments.  This also stems from the emergence of research on CCSs that
entails  envisaging  a  great  diversity  of  possible  results  without  having  adopted  a
comprehensive interpretative grid, as a closed grid of this sort would act as a barrier to
the inflow of information from work going on in the field. We can, however, mention
some indicators. The impact of CCSs can be measured by their ability to avoid financial
and economic  exclusion (Williams,  1996b).  Two criteria  are  usually  adopted for  this:
direct creation of jobs at local level, and increase in economic, social and human capital
held by individuals in situations of exclusion. Seyfang (2003) selected as a criterion for
measuring escapes from social exclusion the ability of CCS to enable users to assert their
rights  as  citizens:  social  rights  (integration  into  networks,  bonds  of  reciprocity),
economic rights (having an income; receiving recognition in work; consuming; saving),
and political rights (participating in public and associative decision-making). Fare (2011)
prefers  three multi-dimensional  criteria:  territorialisation of  activities  (localisation of
exchanges, creation of social links, participation in democratic process); intensification of
the  dynamics  of  exchange  (development  of  access  to  credit,  empowerment,  struggle
against  poverty),  and  change  in  practices,  lifestyles  and  social  representations
(responsible  consumption,  ecological  citizenship,  making  organisations  responsible,
valorising the capacities of each and everyone, and collective empowerment). In the case
of those CCSs that only have social aims, the main impact criterion adopted is the ability
of the CCS to create social bonds of mutual aid and solidarity,  using the Granovetter
analytical grid that represents bonds as either strong or weak (Nakazato and Hiramoto,
2012). Their impact on the fight against social inequalities - and in particular inequalities
that are gender-based - has also been measured (Bogani and Parysow, 2005; Lenzi, 2006).
10 Whatever the criteria adopted to measure impacts,  on the whole the individual-level
surveys  indicate  that  the  impact  of  CCSs  on  local  economic  activity  is  slight  when
assessed in macroeconomic terms. This has been confirmed by Michel and Hudon (2015)
in their impact survey. The absence of a marked impact can be explained in part by the
fact that the CCSs concerned involved only low numbers of users and small volumes of
activity (usually a few hundred to a few thousand users per CCS: see Table 2). Most CCSs
involve relatively few people, with one notable exception, however: the Argentine barter
clubs,  which  at  one  time  involved  2.5  million  people  (Gomez,  2009).  Seyfang  and
Longhurst  (2013b)  describe  these  monetary  schemes  as  socio-technical  niches:  local
grassroots innovations springing from citizens’ initiatives experimenting with alternative
lifestyles and sustainable practices. They can be considered “small-scale”. When the size
of  these  experiments  is  too  small,  however,  their  impacts  remain  marginal  on  the
dynamics of local economies, as is shown in Krohn and Snyder or in Aldrige et al. (2003),
who deal with LETS in the UK. Even in the case of Argentina - the largest in terms of the
number of users and volume of transactions - Colacelli and Blackburn (2009) found that
the barter clubs enabled Argentina’s gross domestic product to grow by only 0,6% in 2002.
The impact of CCSs on economic dynamics is also influenced by the conditions under
which money circulates. Furthermore, Kurita, Miyazaki and Nishibe (2012), in a study of
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coupons in Japan, have shown that the degree of knowledge of a currency has a forceful
impact on its  circulation.  Similarly,  according to McBurnie (2012),  there is  a positive
correlation between the awareness of its benefits and the desire to use a currency. This
leads us to infer that action has been taken to make non-users aware of the alternative
system with a view to expanding the population of CCS users.  As far as conventional
economics is concerned – an approach that usually operates on a far grander scale – the
limited scale of the CCS is problematic: these monetary systems are apparently judged too
insignificant to make much difference to the overall economy. 
 
3. A problem encountered in justifying the use of CCSs
in market economies
11 CCSs confront conventional economics with a second kind of problem: the difficulty of
justifying their use in market economies.
12 According  to  this  approach,  money  is  defined  as  a  universal  medium  of  exchange
accepted by everyone and without costs in a given geographic area. This is its value. It
constitutes a promise of goods to its holder. Money is thought of as an invention of the
market economy aimed at moving beyond barter. In the beginning there was barter, then
money appeared: a means of solving the famous problem of the double coincidence of
needs. The fable of the double coincidence of needs is one of the classic explanations of
the emergence of money. It crops up as early as 1776 (Smith 1995), and then in 1892
(Menger), and persists implicitly today in models of pure monetary theory (Kiyotaki and
Wright, 1993), despite a broad consensus among historians, anthropologists, heterodox
economists,  and  sociologists  of  money  refuting  this  imaginary  genesis  (Aglietta  and
Orléan, 1998; Davies, 1994; Ingham 2000, 2002; Testard, 2001). This monetary genesis is
totally in line with their theoretical conception of money. If money is defined as a pure
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economic object,  as an instrument of exchange, then its genesis stems from a purely
functional model: as there is a logistical problem to solve, the device to solve it will be
invented  accordingly  (Ould  Ahmed,  2010).  In  this  perspective,  the  emergence  of
alternative currencies is understood in terms of currency substitution, of competition
between  currencies  to  become  the  universal  means  of  payment.  The  substitution  of
currencies stems from a theoretical conception of money that is based on the postulate of
its fungibility, money being seen as a universal means of payment, with no unit bearing
any sign that could distinguish it from another of the same value. The use of one currency
rather than another is therefore simply the result of optimal monetary arbitrages by
agents in terms of yield or of the transactional costs entailed in the use of alternative
currencies.
13 However, the creation and development of CCSs cannot be grasped within this theoretical
conception of money. On the one hand, if one analyses the reasons for which CCSs have
come into being, these particular monetary arrangements are not the result of arbitrage
on the basis of the comparative transaction costs and yields of different currencies; their
emergence is not linked solely either to the problem of liquidity shortage of the official
currency or to a monetary crisis that could have led to recourse to alternative currencies.
This  latter  type  of  explanation  does  hold,  however,  for  the  first  local  monetary
experiments of  the 19th and early 20 th century 4.  At the time,  local  currencies usually
corresponded to emergencies, appearing during periods of war, monetary crisis or cash-
flow  difficulties,  and  disappearing  when  the  monetary  and  economic  conjuncture
improved or when the public authorities prohibited their circulation (as in the cases of
the Wära, the Valor and the Wörgl). As of the 1990s, however, this was no longer the only
explanatory  factor  involved.  Agents’  motivations  were  not  exclusively  monetary  in
nature; they also entertained economic, social and/or environmental objectives (Fare,
2011;  Seyfang  and  Longhurst,  2013a).  This  was  the  case  for  example  with  the  local
currencies of Transition Towns in the UK, set up with a view to transforming and re-
localising sectors such as energy, healthcare, farming, and business – in order to make
the territory more resilient and better able to cope with climate change and peak oil. 
14 On the other hand, in view of their limited functional properties, the use capacity of CCSs
in  the  world  of  trade  is  narrow  limited  in  time  and  restricted  to  certain  types  of
commodity exchanges. CCSs do not resemble money that is accepted by all concerned parties
and is cost-free in the such-and such a geographical area. They are more like “special” purpose
currencies,  in  the  terminology  of  Polanyi  (1957).  With  the  development  of
complementary  currencies  we  see  the  emergence  of  heterogeneous  forms  of  money
(Ingham,  2001,  2004),  and  in  particular  a  plurality  of  territorially  confined  means  of
payment  with  delimited  social  uses.  In  this  way,  money  should  produce  and  serve
determinate objectives and values (ecological,  social,  non-capitalist,  etc.) claimed by a
local market community. 
15 In  the  first  place,  they  have  territorial  limits:  they  can  be  used  only  in  specific
geographical regions. They can also be limited to particular communities (Blanc, 2002):
the circulation and value of currencies have to be validated by voluntary adherents of the
systems. The community or association in question has to be set up for the sake of the
money,  which  is  created  by  a  citizens’  movement  (Blanc,  2013).  Furthermore,  some
currencies  are  used by specific  actors.  Some initiatives,  for  example  in  France,  local
currencies (the Abeille, the Mesure, the SOL Violette, etc.) promote the direct consumption
of socio-economic partners who respect social and environmental criteria that have been
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incorporated into a charter,  following the application of selection criteria (Blanc and
Fare, 2016). Although these charters often appear as banners, they affirm the values and
the  symbolic  universe  of  the  payment  community.  The  purchasing  power  of  these
currencies can be narrowed still further by rules of usage and mechanisms of monetary
issuing and regulation. Most CCSs in circulation are not legally convertible into official
currencies  (Table  1).  Local  currencies  (often  in  paper  or  electronic  form),  however,
assume a possibility of conversion, in particular because they integrate into the circuit
enterprises producing and distributing goods and services. A fixed relation of equivalence
is set up to link the local to the national currency, and both can be used at any given time.
It is possible to enter into the local system from the national one by converting one
currency into the other; but exit from the system is not always possible; when it is, it
reserved for professionals; penalties (in the form of a conversion tax) are attached to exit,
in order to limit the risk of mass sell-offs of the local money (e.g. the Brixton Pound in
UK, the Abeille in France).
16 Moreover, there are limits to the complementary currencies use in space, but this is not
all.  Some CCSs have time limits  to their  validity.  Money can carry a  demurrage fee,
according to a  principle  devised by the economist  Silvio Gesell  (1958):  its  face value
decreases regularly (over three to six months),  and can be restored only by adding a
complement (affixing a stamp that has to be purchased). Conservation fees can thus be
attached to the money in order to encourage circulation and discourage accumulation.
Money becomes perishable, “like goods and labour” (Gesell, 1958, p. 215). This monetary
theory was encouraged by Keynes in The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money
(book 6, note 23) during the US great Depression. Local currencies based on a system of
stamped  notes  (subject  to  a  cost  of  demurrage,  and  depreciating  with  time)  were
inaugurated by the Wära that circulated in 1930 in Schwanenkirchen (Germany), followed
by the Wörgl in Austria in 1931, the “Valor” in France in 1933, and the Stamp Scrip in the
USA, also in 1933 (under the influence of the economist Irving Fisher5). Later, in France
during the 1950s, a system of local vouchers was developed in Lignières-en-Berry and in
Marans; very much later, in Argentina, in some currencies used by barter clubs; and, as of
the new millennium, in Germany, in regional currencies (such as the Chiemgauer); and,
last but not least, the Stroud pound, launched in the UK in 2009 (Scott Cato and Suárez,
2012), and in France in local currencies (for example the Abeille). 
 
4. A monetary plurality regime confronted to a
problem of official recognition 
17 A regime of monetary plurality consists in a diversity of units of account and means of
payment  within  a  given  space  (defined  in  terms  of  markets  and  territories).  The
development of CCSs has set up a particular regime of monetary plurality, characterised
by  the  coexistence  of  official  and  community  currencies  used  in  compartmentalised
commercial spaces that though distinct from one another are nonetheless inter-related.
Having  briefly  revisited  monetary  approaches  that  are  able  to  apprehend  monetary
plurality regimes, we will now examine the limits of these regimes in accounting for the
particular case that interests us in this article.
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4.1. How monetary theories understand regimes of monetary
plurality?
18 We have examined in  synthesis  the  way in  which the main contemporary economic
theories account for – or fail to account for – the regimes of monetary plurality (Blanc et
al., 2017). Three sets of approaches have been identified. The first set makes no allowance
whatever for monetary plurality. Only State money is perceived as real money, and only
the official  authorities  can issue  it.  No unofficial  means  of  payment  circulating in  a
territory governed by State authorities can be recognised as money (Lerner, 1947). This is
the case in particular with the Chartalist school,  following the work of Knapp (1924).
Monetarism also reserves for the State alone the right to issue money. If the neutrality of
money is to be guaranteed and inflation controlled, money – or rather, the money supply
– cannot be allowed to come from a private source.  Monetary plurality constitutes a
violation of sovereign rights, and alternative currencies are simply forgeries (Wray, 1998).
19 A second set of theories recognises a plurality of issuers and of instruments of trade. The
space provided is nonetheless conditional: the unit of account must be unique. On the
question of the unit of account, however, there are two very different approaches, not
only  to  monetary organisation,  but  also  to  economics  in  general.  Post-Keynesianism,
post-Marxism and the French Regulation School (Aglietta and Orléan, 2002; Théret, 2008)
see monetary plurality as a characteristic of the monetary economy of production. They
reject the hypothesis of an exclusive right of the State to issue currency, and recognise a
plurality of private issuers (e.g. banks, and even enterprises), who put into circulation a
diversity of means of payment (i.e. of private debts). Nonetheless, to enjoy the status of
money, these private debts must conform to the monetary rule, i.e. prove their capacity
for  conversion  into  the  official  currency.  Approaches  of  this  type  are  based  on  a
conception  of  monetary  and  banking  systems  as  hierarchies  over  which  preside  the
official currency (the unique unit of account) and the official monetary system. Monetary
plurality is seen as an expression of the plurality of instruments of trade, with levels of
acceptance (liquidity) that vary (a factor in times of crisis), and/or with varying yields. If
these alternative currencies are not convertible, the plurality is seen as a pathology of the
monetary system. According to another approach,  and in particular to some cash-in-
advance  models  (particularly  Sturzenegger,  1992)  and  search  models  (Kiyotaki  and
Wright, 1993; Kocherlakota and Krueger, 1999), monetary plurality is seen as a result of
optimal selection by rational economic agents. This operation is framed in a decentralised
economy regulated by competition between markets,  with money being treated as an
instrument of exchange. Simultaneous circulation of different instruments of trade (e.g.
fiat  money,  national  currency,  foreign  currency,  interest-bearing  check  accounts,
commodity money, credit cards, and so forth) is seen as problematic, as the currencies
are not perfectly interchangeable and have different yields and degrees of acceptability.
20 The last  set  of  approaches takes a normative view in advocating monetary plurality.
These  approaches  presuppose  the  existence  of  a  decentralised  market  and  perfect
competition. Examples are Mengerian theories of money (Free Banking; the competitive
fiat  money  model)  and  monetary  theories  that  integrate  financial  economics  [New
Monetary Economics initiated by Black (1970) and Fama (1980)]. Monetary functions are
no longer carried out by a single currency; the unit of account is issued either by the
central bank (in Free Banking and the competitive fiat money model) or by the market
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(NME);  it  is  not  linked  to  the  plurality  of  competing  bank  currencies  that  serve  as
instruments of business, the value of which is determined by the market (the financial
market in the case of NME). Competitive fiat money models (Hayek, 1978; Klein, 1974) go
even further than this, supposing in addition a plurality of units of account: banks have
their  own  trademarks  and  issue  their  own  scrip  as  a  means  of  payment.  Monetary
plurality  is  analysed  as  an  optimal  arrangement that  is  nonetheless  subject  to  the
existence of a unique or common unit of account that regulates the system. NME and the
competitive fiat money models envisage regulation by the market only, and reject all
rules  of  convertibility  applicable  to  private  moneys  on  conversion  into  the  central
currency. A central currency is nonetheless recognised to guarantee the stability of the
system, in the case of competitive flat money. NME sets up competition between private
banking  currencies  treated  as  (interest-bearing)  financial  assets,  and  inter-bank
settlements are channelled through clearing houses.  Free Banking (Selgin and White,
1994), does not reject centralisation of inter-bank compensation operations and the need
to convert one by one private bank currencies into a central public currency (the single
unit of account).
 
4.2. CCS invalidate the hypotheses of monetary economic theories
21 Monetary plurality approaches mark out the limits of possibility as far as the issuer of
money is  concerned,  at  the same time as  the legal  status  of  the currency itself,  the
relationship between different currencies within a single space, and the regulation of the
monetary system as a whole. We shall now explain why CCS can only be problematic to
the hypothetical, theoretical and normative thinking in these approaches. 
22 As to the issuer, first of all these theories recognise only two types: the State and banks
(but also sometimes, though rarely, enterprises). CCSs, however, are issued by none of the
above, but by actors who belong to civil society. Monetary specialists presumably greet
monetary initiatives of this sort with a sceptical smile; they see money as a mere tool,
supposedly technical; its creation and management are matters for technical experts and
legitimate official institutions. Creation of money by actors of civil society is a breach of
the  traditional  practice  of  monetary  sovereignty  and  of  the  legal  status  of  national
currencies, always held in law to be sovereign and exclusive. National and supra-national
monetary systems today appear always to be characterised by a unitary conception of
money and a hierarchical organisation headed by a central issuing authority ensuring the
convertibility of private currencies into the central currency and ensuring the stability of
the system. Historically, however, the conception of money as homogeneous and unique
has  at  times  been  challenged.  This  conception  has  not always  corresponded
incontrovertibly to reality. Considerations of this sort, however, have always remained
largely  marginal;  reminders  by  the  central  sovereignty  seem  to  have  sufficed  to
discourage temptations to dissidence.  This  is  why CCSs invite all  stakeholders in the
economy to question their own roles and positions, and to reflect on the part that could
possibly  be  played  by  complementary  monetary  schemes6.  What  impact  would
complementary schemes have on the issues raised by the organisation of today’s societies
(democratisation,  new  sources  of  wealth,  new  values,  commons,  preservation  of
resources, transition/transformation of behaviour patterns and levels of awareness, etc.)?
Studies  on  CCS  in  the  political  economy  of  money,  and  a  number  of  case  studies
(Argentine barter clubs,  SEL in France,  LETS in UK, Green Money in Hungary,  Green
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dollars in New Zealand, etc),  show that CCSs can play a part in re-territorialising the
sphere  of  politics  by  creating  new  spaces  for  a  contestation  and  liberation  of  the
monetary order (Laacher,  2003;  North, 2007;  Ould Ahmed, 2009).  CCSs can be seen as
social organisations with political aims, their objective being to construct, by means of
collective action, new economic and social bonds that respect new values rather than the
prevalent capitalist norms. In these new systems, the bonds formed between participants
are not merely social; they are also “politicised”, as Laacher (2003) has rightly pointed
out. In most cases these bonds are established outside conventional political structures,
representatives and spaces (Ould Ahmed 2014). However, it is above all the leaders and
organisers of these CCSs who experience the political component as such; the rank-and-
file users’ expectations are more practical, both materially and symbolically.
23 A second characteristic of money is its status. Monetary theories are based on the idea
that the status of  money is  part  of  law.  Only State money and the official  means of
payment are recognised as real money. Recognition of the monetary nature of private
bank currencies is conditional (according to the theory concerned) on the convertibility
of the private currency into other currencies and/or into the State currency. Money is
recognised as money by its legality and convertibility. As CCSs exist in a legal vacuum, as
is  often the case,  they do not  enjoy legal  recognition as  money and as  legal  tender.
Absence of legal recognition, however, has not precluded, in some cases, recognition of
their social utility (e.g. the case of community development banks in Brazil, which are
recognised  as  instruments  that  can  be  used  in  the  struggle  against  poverty  and
exclusion).  Their  legal  framework is  currently  being worked out  or  is  at  least  being
discussed.  For  example,  in  2013,  the  French  supervisory  authority  on  banking  and
insurance officialised its position on French complementary currency systems, indicating
the  legal  framework that  it  intended applying  to  them7;  some currencies  have  been
recognized and incorporated into the law on the social and solidarity economy (this is the
case in France since 2014). Discussions of the same sort are in progress elsewhere, in
particular in Belgium and the UK, and are advancing at various rates. For the time being,
however, there is no regulatory framework into which they fit or that recognises their
specificity (Blanc and Fare, 2013). 
24 Most  of  these currencies  have not  been recognised by official  monetary institutions,
whether private or public.  They are not officially convertible into either private (i.e.
bank) or public (State) currencies. Not being recognised as part of the official monetary
system, most of these arrangements are not subject to supervision and regulation by the
central banks of their respective countries. Lacking convertibility into other currencies of
any  sort  (community,  bank,  national,  foreign  exchange),  their  existence  is  usually
tenuous. Their purchasing power as we have seen is restricted to the community space in
which  they  circulate.  An  exception  should  nonetheless  be  pointed  out:  that  of  local
currencies  that  in  fact  are  convertible  into  private  bank  currencies  and,  are  also
apparently in some cases subject to supervision by the central authorities. Their capacity
for conversion, however, does not flow from a legal obligation but from organisational
options taken at the time of their inception. 
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5. Conclusion: Other methodological and theoretical
perspectives are more adequately equipped to study
CCSs 
25 Logically,  the  hypothesis,  methodology  and  normative  conceptions  of  money  by
conventional economics lead to consider CCSs either as non-monetary phenomena (as
they  do  not  constitute  legal  tender),  or  as  merely  insignificant  and  marginal  (their
purchasing  power  being  too  limited);  or  –  yet  another  possibility  –  as  a  punctual
alternative linked to a lack of official currency in quantity or quality 
26 A socio-economic and institutional approach to money seems more helpful in revealing
the nature, logics and impact of the complementary monetary practices. Research on this
specific perspective started out in the field of  economic geography and subsequently
moved towards those of  socioeconomics and institutional  economics.  They reject  the
reductive conception of money as merely a universal means of payment. Money is defined
as a fundamental social institution of all societies: the institution that enables people to
settle debts thanks to the practices of accounting and payment. 
27 This  presupposes  on  the  one  hand that  a  specific  method is  adopted  for  evaluating
impacts in conducting field surveys that use such methods of sociology and anthropology
as participatory observation8 or qualitative field surveys9.
28 This methodological pluralism makes it possible to mobilise methods and tools that are
proper  to  the  research  that  is  under  way  or  are  shared  with  other  disciplines
(quantitative and qualitative, using individual and/or collective interviews and surveys
based  on  questionnaires).  This  combined  methodology  helps  to  reveal  the
multidimensional nature, the specific logics and the implications of CCSs. A perspective of
this sort is incompatible with the classic economic view of money as a “natural”, neutral
element in the economic process, and gives pride of place to money viewed as a social
construction. It mobilises a comprehensive set of tools, starting out with an observation
of  monetary  practices,  and  progressively  formulating  theoretical  concepts  and
elaborating  them  on  the  basis  of  experience.  This  orients  research  towards  the
production  of  highly  contextualised  primary  data  generated  directly  in  the  actual
practice of fieldwork.  Sociological  and anthropological  methods are necessary for the
proper evaluation of many CCS, especially those that aim to create social bonds of mutual
aid and solidarity. As a result, impact studies of CCSs give precedence to the analysis of
social  utility  (Defourny  and  Nyssens,  2008),  in  order  to  deepen  the  grasp  and
understanding of CCSs. 
29 On the  other  hand,  these  approaches  highlight  the  fact  that  money  is  the  common
medium or expression of the value that a community returns to each of its members in
the form of an act of payment corresponding to that which is deemed to have accrued to
the community from the member's activity (Aglietta et al.,  2016; Aglietta and Orléan,
1998). By obtaining complementary currency in return for the trade of goods or services,
a member obtains purchasing power in this community. This means that constraints on
the validity  of  these currencies  can,  seen from this  point  of  view,  be interpreted as
advantages. 
30 Indeed,  seen from the  point  of  view of  a  local  economy,  their  local  validity  can  be
advantageous. In the restricted territory in which they are used, these currencies can
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have a beneficial effect on local economies, affecting them in an endogenous manner
(consumption taking  place  inside  a  local  monetary  and territorial  space;  creation of
resources and of new outlets and of jobs), and thereby promoting a new development
model,  based  on  local  producers  or  enterprises  and  extra-economic  values.  The
combination between microcredit  and local  currency,  as in the Brazilian experiment,
constitutes a particularly powerful development tool by financing productive activities
inside the territory and improving the local supply. Use of a local and territorial currency
can  also  strengthen  local  community  links  and  local  identity,  as  for  example  the
community development banks do in Brazil (Neiva et al., 2013; Fare et al., 2015). Under
certain conditions a setup of this sort can increase or improve the territorial economic
effects of CCSs. Local authorities can play a decisive role here (Blanc and Fare, 2013a).
Recognition of the social  utility of CCSs by public authorities and economic decision-
makers could increase their potential influence on the entire socio-economic system. For
example, local authorities could accept the payment of public services and of local taxes
in local currencies (this is already the case with the Bristol Pound in the UK, to take one
example). When they are combined with other mechanisms and instruments used by the
local  authorities  and  their  partners,  the  leverage  effect  of  CCSs  also  increases  by
connecting up the logics and tools stemming from the social and solidarity economy (the
“third sector”) and applying them to social and economic development. Nevertheless,
unlike CCSs that have economic objectives, those that have social aims do not seek to
expand their  scale  of  application.  This  is  the case in particular  with the French SEL
(Laacher, 2003; Servet,  1999),  with Time banks (Seyfang, 2004),  with Accorderie (Fare,
2012) and also with some Japanese local currency systems, the chiiki tsûka (Hirota, 2006;
Nakazato and Hiramoto, 2012).
31 Last but not least, an institutional approach to money enables us to conceive of monetary
plurality regimes and to interpret this plurality in terms of subsidiarity (Fare, 2017)
rather  than  competition.  Indeed,  the  qualitative  criteria  for  conversion  and  the
differentiation inherent in CCSs invalidate the hypothesis of pure fungibility of money
(Blanc,  2008).  This  leads  us  to  prefer  a  theoretical  approach  that  allows  for
complementarities, and even for subsidiarity in monetary matters instead of restricting
the relationship to one of competition (Fare, 2011). In the matter of sustainable territorial
development, Fare (2011, 2017) investigated the conditions affecting the establishment
and acceptability of CCS and their appropriate scale, suggesting a monetary design based
on subsidiarity in this particular context of monetary plurality, i.e. subsidiarity based on
the implementation of monetary schemes at the lowest relevant level. This amounted,
finally, to pressing the principle of complementarities to its limit, determining for each
currency (taking account of the relevant objectives according to each model of CCS) a
single and singular scale for  deployment in the framework of  rejuvenated territorial
governance.  The  diversity  of  scheme  makes  it  possible  to  think  of  possible
complementarity between these currencies so as to satisfy the objectives of sustainable
territorial development. Subsidiary currencies thus seek to implement democratically a
specific  currency  at  each  relevant  level  and  at  the  best  decision-making  level  for
achieving the objectives assigned to them in the perspective of answering the challenges
of sustainable local development. Boïk (2014) also suggests using a first-in-class micro-
simulation model of a local-national currency system based on the principle of monetary
subsidiarity  within  the  framework  of  LEDDA  (Local  Economic  Direct  Democracy
Association). LEDDA economic direct democracy is a local, parallel economic system that
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synthesizes a host of local, open, and participatory approaches to make them scalable,
efficient, secure, stable, and user-friendly.
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NOTES
1. As Lietaer et al., (2010) we use the term of “conventional economic thought” which assumes
that the monopoly of  fiat  national  currency is  an unquestionable given and therefore which
ignores monetary plurality.
2. This  does  not  preclude  the  existence  of  published  databases  and  supplemented  by
practitioners, see for example : http://www.complementarycurrency.org or http://community-
currency.info/ 
3. In this article we exclude cryptocurrencies. Contrarily to the Bitcoin, CCSs are associated to
social projects based on solidarity and environmental values. Bitcoins and cryptocurrencies have
been characterized as anonymous and deterritorialized currencies in opposition to CCS (Ould
Ahmed and Ponsot,  2015).  Bitcoin has been the subject of critical analysis (see Lakomski and
Desmedt, 2015) excluding it from the CCS because of its anti-common character (Dupré et al.,
2015). Nevertheless a diversity of cryptocurrencies have been developed. As regards to these new
experiments,  it  seems  possible  to  develop  cryptocurrencies  in  the  social  perspective  of  CCS
(Haines, 2017; Rolland, 2017)
4. For a historical approach to monetary experiments of the 19th century, see North (2007).
5. During the US Great depression in the 1930s, Fisher proposed to set up this kind of monetary
rule to Roosevelt (but he didn’t convince him) (Gatch, 2012).
6. For an analysis of considerations underpinning the right of non-governmental actors to create
new currencies, see in particular Dodd (2014).
7. See:  http://www.acpr.banque-france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/acp/publications/revue-
acp/201309-Revue-autorite-controle-prudentiel-resolution.pdf 
8. It’s a method stemming from anthropological practice, which favours direct observation by
the  researcher  of  practices,  and  takes  time  and  place  into  account  in  the  researchers’
observations.
9. “Spot” studies, discontinuous but repeated, focused on the life-trajectories of actors (by means
of semi-directive surveys and interviews, statistics) stemming from anthropology and qualitative
sociology.
ABSTRACTS
Complementary  currency  system  (CCS)  complements  the  official  currency,  with  a  view  to
accounting for  and regulating  exchanges  of  goods  and services  in  a  local  space.  Despite  the
topicality and the number of these complementary currencies, the large majority of economists
seem  to  pay  marginal  attention  to  them.  This  article  proposes  some  reasons  to  explain  it.
Fundamentally,  conventional  economics  is  based  on  a  methodological  approach  and  on
theoretical and normative conceptions of money – its essence, status, size, and governance – that
prevent it from understanding these monetary schemes. First, the heterogeneity of CCS and their
new emergence confront economics to a methodological problem of measure of their impacts.
Next, we show that, because of their limited purchasing power in time and in space, economics
can’t justify their use in market economy. Last, we will see that the monetary rules of issuing and
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regulating CSS prevent main contemporary monetary approaches to recognize and legitimate
them. 
Les monnaies complémentaires (MC) permettent de comptabiliser et de régler des échanges de
biens et de services dans un espace local et circulent en complémentarité de la monnaie officielle.
Malgré leur actualité et leur nombre, la grande majorité des économistes semblent accorder une
attention  marginale  à  ces  monnaies  complémentaires.  Cet  article  propose  quelques  facteurs
explicatifs.  Fondamentalement,  l'économie  conventionnelle  est  basée  sur  une  approche
méthodologique et sur des conceptions théoriques et normatives de la monnaie - son essence,
son  statut,  sa  taille  et  sa  gouvernance  -  qui  l'empêchent  de  comprendre  ces  dispositifs
monétaires.  Tout  d’abord,  l'hétérogénéité  des  MC  et  leur  émergence nouvelle  confrontent
l'économie à un problème méthodologique de mesure de leurs impacts. Ensuite, nous montrons
que, en raison de leur pouvoir d'achat limité dans le temps et dans l'espace, l'économie ne peut
justifier  leur  utilisation  dans  l'économie  marchande.  Enfin,  nous  verrons  que  les  règles
monétaires d'émission et de régulation des MC empêchent les principales approches monétaires
contemporaines de les reconnaître et de les légitimer.
INDEX
Mots-clés: monnaie, monnaie complémentaire, convertibilité, études d'impact, souveraineté,
pouvoir d'achat
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